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TIME ON STATION REQUIREMENTS: COSTS, POLICY 




The Department of Defense (DOD) continuously seeks ways to cut costs, and 
Congress has directed the DOD to reduce permanent change of station (PCS) expenses. 
One option that may reduce expenses and improve quality of life without sacrificing 
readiness is to increase time on station (TOS). Accordingly, this project evaluates how 
Marines feel about the current TOS policy as well as how they would feel if the 
requirements increased from three to five years. We developed and fielded a survey to 
capture attitudes about TOS requirements and econometric tools analyzed responses. Our 
findings show that while 80% reported the current TOS policy adequately supports career 
development, 67% think longer TOS will improve quality of life and 85% think longer 
TOS will not sacrifice unit readiness. Moreover, the Marine Corps stands to save $38M 
annually by increasing its rotation cycle from three to five years. We take these results as 
evidence that Marines support longer TOS and a change in policy might be beneficial to 
the institution.  
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During a time of fiscal uncertainty, the Department of Defense (DOD) must find 
ways to operate within a constrained budget. One proposal directed by Congress was to 
evaluate the department’s permanent change of station (PCS) program and determine 
potential savings from program revisions. Specific areas Congress sought to understand 
were 1) current spending on PCS moves; 2) previous changes to PCS policy and 
associated savings; 3) the extent to which services meet rotational goals; and 4) the 
impacts that lengthened tour rotations could have on unit readiness, stability for service 
members and families, and cost savings (SASC, 2014). As will be discussed in Chapter 
II, many studies have been conducted in these areas; however, none have resulted in 
policy changes or decisions. Cost savings in terms of budgetary outlays are inevitable 
when the number of annual PCS moves decrease. However, understanding the 
perceptions and attitudes of Marines to lengthening tours can provide decision makers 
with valuable perspective to potential benefits as well as unintended consequences to 
retention, morale, unit cohesion, and ultimately readiness to complete a given mission. 
This project specifically evaluates how Marines feel about the current TOS policy as well 
as how they would feel if the requirements increased from three to five years. 
A. BACKGROUND 
 Debates over national priorities, coupled with a growing national deficit, tend to 
target discretionary spending to absorb budget cuts. Discretionary spending is the portion 
of president’s budget that requires annual approval from Congress and is provided in the 
form of appropriations. As federal agencies seek ways to reduce spending levels and 
operate within constrained budgets, none are more targeted for reduction than the DOD’s 
since its budget accounts for more than half of all discretionary spending. As 
commander-in-chief, the president of the United States assists the DOD in reducing 
spending by implementing mandatory budgets cuts. These spending cuts require 
leadership to make difficult choices on how to prioritize competing interests within DOD.  
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For example, in the Marine Corps, constrained fiscal resources have come at a 
cost of readiness, equipment, and maintenance. Faced with full sequestration in the FY 
2014 budget, General Amos (then Commandant of the Marine Corps [CMC]) had to 
make the difficult choice to maintain operational training and readiness by cutting 
important programs like the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC). General Amos said “the 
MPC is off the table. It’s not a function of it wasn’t a good idea or there wasn’t a need—
but you can’t have everything you want.” (Freedberg, 2013). That year, General Amos 
was prepared to decrease aircraft, cut MPC, and reduce personnel in order to save critical 
programs like the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV), which replaced the Expeditionary 
Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program canceled just two years earlier due to fiscal constraints.  
Most recently in his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) 
in March 2016 on FY2017’s budget, General Robert Neller, current CMC, stated that 
“The fiscal reductions and instability of the past few years have impacted our readiness” 
(Neller, 2016). He further notes that fiscal constraints require prioritization in readiness to 
ensure deployed and next-to-deploy units receive head-of-the-line privileges in readiness 
resources, while “non-deployed commands lack sufficient resources to meet the 
necessary personnel, training, and equipment readiness levels in order to respond today.” 
General Neller concluded, “the Marine Corps is no longer in a position to generate 
current readiness and reset our equipment, while sustaining our facilities, and 
modernization to ensure future readiness” (2016).  
These exerts highlight the key issue for the Marine Corps, which is how to sustain 
the nation’s “Force in Readiness” within a constrained fiscal environment. In order to 
accomplish this, Marine leadership will continue to argue the merits of certain programs 
like the Joint Strike Fighter and ACV. However, they also recognize that budgets may 
continue to shrink or remain constant at the very least. The result is identifying new areas 
to gain efficiencies in spending and execution. Service PCS programs is one such area. 
Accordingly, in the FY15 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress 
directed the GAO to evaluate its PCS program and the potential cost savings it could 
provide.  
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B. UNDERSTANDING THE PCS PROGRAM 
A PCS move is when a service member is reassignment from one Permanent Duty 
Station (PDS) to another. The DOD provides instructions and guidance regarding military 
assignments in DOD Instruction (DODI) 1315.18. The purpose of the instruction is to 
provide the services with policies and procedure needed to establish service specific 
assignment programs that ensure, among other things, “an equitable assignment 
system…professional development…stability in tour completions…tour lengths consistent 
with…combat capability and readiness, and PCS stability” (2015). Per this instruction,  
TOS requirements are established to enhance operational readiness by 
stabilizing members in CONUS units, reduce PCS costs, and improve 
quality of life by reducing personal and family turbulence. When all other 
factors are equal, TOS will be a primary consideration in selecting Service 
members for reassignment. (DOD Instruction [DODI] 1315.18, 2015) 
Since most service members are required to maintain current qualifications for 
promotion and career progression, TOS often becomes the primary consideration for 
reassignment. For assignments within or from the Continental United States (CONUS) 
the minimum TOS is 36 months. This means that a service member must meet this 
minimum prior to executing a PCS move to another PDS. However, the instruction 
provides numerous exceptions to policy, ranging from a reassignment to an overseas sea 
tour to a reassignment under the Exceptional Family Member Program. The DODI 
acknowledges there is no specific format required for establishing procedures for 
monitoring and measuring the PCS program. Instead, the instruction recognizes the 
uniqueness of each service and delegates this responsibility to the Service Secretaries. 
The result is each service executes PCS assignments according to their mission.  
Marine Corps Order (MCO) P1300.8S governs the military assignment process 
for the Marine Corps. This order is essentially a derivative of the DODI 1315.18, and 
acknowledges all instructions previously discussed. The purpose of the order is stated in 
commander’s intent and reads as follows: 
The Marine Corps will limit the number of Permanent Change of Station 
(PCS) moves to those required to achieve/maintain combat readiness or to 
ensure equitable treatment and career development of individual Marines. 
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This policy further improves combat readiness by controlling personnel 
turnover, increasing the stability of Marine families, and reducing PCS 
costs. (Marine Corps Order [MCO] P1300.8S, 2014) 
In terms of cost, the MCO directs that “each PCS transfer be met with the least 
amount of funds and that low-cost moves (LCM) and no-cost Permanent Change of 
Assignment (PCA) orders be issued whenever possible” (2014). An LCM is a PCS move 
typically within 50 miles of a current duty station. Per DODI 1315.18, the cost of an 
LCM is typically not more than $1,000. A PCA is a reassignment to a new command that 
is typically within the same installation. Although this portion of the policy meets the 
commander’s intent in reducing PCS cost, this action can effect career progression and 
promotion.  
Since this project specifically evaluates the effects of lengthening the TOS 
requirements (in an effort to reduce costs), it is important to understand how to 
implement the TOS requirements prescribed by the DODI. MCO P1300.8S states that 
“TOS requirements are meant to stabilize Marines and their families and reduce PCS 
costs.” Further it says “There is no maximum tour length prescribed for CONUS tour 
lengths” and “The minimum TOS requirement for CONUS is 36 months” (2014). This 
means that in order to stabilize movements of families, maintain combat readiness and 
effectiveness, and to reduce cost, a Marine should not PCS until they have served 36 
months within their current assignment. The Marine Corps’ PCS program does not 
prescribe a maximum tour length. However, as previous stated, remaining at a duty 
station beyond 36 months can be perceived to have negative effects to a Marine’s career.  
C. UNDERSTANDING PCS COSTS 
The cost of a PCS move largely depends on the type of move being executed. 
Each year the Marine Corps must budget for various PCS types. Actual costs are 
explored in later chapters. The purpose here is to identify the PCS types. It is important to 
note that this research focuses on Operational and Rotational Travel only. Accession and 
Training PCS moves are not analyzed because both are required to maintain statutory 
manning levels and are not amenable to a policy change. Likewise, Separations PCS is 
not analyzed because it is not responsive to a TOS policy change. Finally, Unit PCS 
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occurs so infrequently that analysis in this category is irrelevant. Table 1 includes a list of 
PCS types. 






Officers & Enlisted who are called/recalled from home of record or 
recruiting station to their duty station or training. 
Training 
Travel 
Officer & Enlisted within the continental U.S. (CONUS) who move to a 
formal military or civilian school to attend a period of instruction of 20 
weeks or more in duration.  
Operational 
Travel 
Officer & Enlisted who travel from one duty station within the CONUS to 
another duty station within the continental U.S. 
Rotational 
Travel 
Officer & Enlisted who travel from one duty station within the CONUS to 




Officer & Enlisted who are separating from service and moving from last 
duty station to their home of record or point of entry.  
Unit Travel Officer & Enlisted who travel from one duty station within the CONUS to 
another duty station within the continental U.S. when the move is in 
connection with the relocation of organized unit. 
 
Each of the categories listed Table 1 are part of the Marine Corps Budget Activity 
for PCS and include a variety of allowances and entitlements. The amount of each 
allowance and entitlement is based on particular demographics and PCS circumstances 
unique to each service member (e.g., rank, marital status, number of dependents, next 







Table 2.   PCS cost types and definitions. Adapted from Defense Travel 




Per Diem for PCS 
Travel 
The service member receives the CONUS flat rate of $140/day for travel 
expenses associated with a PCS move (e.g., meals, lodging and incidental 
expenses). Each dependent 12 yo or older receives 75% of the member 




Authorized expense for wear & tear and fuel expense of using your 
personal vehicle to travel to new duty station. $.19/mile 
Household Goods 
(HHG) 
Weight allowances by rank depend on the cost. 
Non-Temp 
Storage 
Storage of HHG/personnel effects at government expense in a non-
temporary storage facility. Must be authorized in orders and is included in 
weight restrictions of HHG. 
Temporary 
Lodging Expense 
Lodging expense for up to 10 days in connection with PCS move within 
CONUS at new or old duty station. Not to exceed (NTE) $290/day/family. 
Apply the following multiples by the local rate. Service member: 65%; 
Service member & 1 dependent 100%; each additional dependent over 12 
yo add 35%; under 12 yo add 25%. Note: additional instructions apply for 
members traveling OCONUS. 
Dislocation 
Allowance (DLA) 
Authorized to partial reimburse a service member for the expenses 
incurred in relocating the member’s household during a PCS move. Rate 
paid at with or without dependent rates. Rates vary depending on rank and 
number of dependents. For example, the rate for a Staff Sergeant (E-6) 
with and without dependent is, $2,350.00 and $1,600.00 respectively. A 
Major’s rate would be $3,500 and 3,042.00, respectively.  
 
The allowances in Table 2 are a general list and does not include all types of cost 
associated with a PCS move. A military move is expensive. A PCS claim includes 
personal entitlements listed in Table 2 paid directly to the member and his/her 
dependents. For example, a Marine family with three dependents will be reimbursed 
approximately $5,000 when they transfer from the east coast to the west coast. This 
amount is from one of the author’s personal experience in the military. There is also the 
less visible, but no less significant, monetary cost the government incurs to move a 
member’s household goods (HHG). A HHG expense is determined by a weight-to-rank 
ratio and transit length. One recent example is it cost the government $6,000 to move a 
Marine Major and his family’s 9,000 pounds of HHG (~75% of the weight-to-rank 
allowance) from San Diego, CA to Monterey, CA. It is also worth noting that this is a 
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much shorter distance by comparison to more frequent and expensive coast-to-coast or 
overseas moves. There are a variety of factors that can impact the cost of an individual 
move; however, the point is to illustrate that PCS cost is extremely cumbersome to 
calculate because no two moves are identical. 
D. SUMMARY 
This project evaluates how Marines feel about the current TOS policy as well as 
how they would feel if the requirements increased from three to five years. We developed 
and fielded a survey to capture attitudes about TOS requirements and econometric tools 
analyzed responses. Our findings show that while 80% reported the current TOS policy 
adequately supports career development, 67% think longer TOS will improve quality of 
life and 85% think longer TOS will not sacrifice unit readiness. Moreover, the Marine 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This research paper drew from a comprehensive body of literature that analyzes 
PCS cost and the effects TOS has on military service members and their families. The 
existing research ranges from research projects conducted by former Naval Postgraduate 
(NPS) students to academic references to comprehensive studies performed by the 
RAND Corporation and GAO. The following format is used to help guide the reader’s 
understanding of the literature reviewed: purpose, Scope and Methodology, conclusion 
and relevance. The first three categories summarize the literature, while relevance 
connects it to our research project. We reviewed the following works:  
A. GAO MILITARY COMPENSATION: DOD NEEDS COMPLETE DATA TO 
ASSESS PERSONNEL RELOCATION COSTS (GAO-15-713)  
Purpose: This 2015 report was the result of a Congressionally directed study into 
the DOD’s PCS program. The report 1) assesses the per-move-cost and how it changed 
over time, 2) assesses whether personnel were meeting TOS obligations, and 3) addresses 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) study regarding the merits of increasing 
TOS requirements. The OSD’s study was performed by the RAND Corporation, which is 
discussed in the next section (Ferrell, 2015).  
Scope and Methodology: This report evaluates the PCS cost throughout DOD and 
the factors that influence change over time. These factors include relevant laws, changes 
to DOD or service-specific PCS policies, and other economic factors. The period of the 
evaluation is between fiscal years 2001 and 2014. Summary cost data is evaluated for the 
six PCS types listed in Table 1 by analyzing each service’s budget materials. The study 
looks at both CONUS and OCONUS moves. Additionally, the study evaluates the 
median and average TOS for each service to evaluate whether service members were 
meeting TOS obligations. The study also reviews waivers and exceptions to policy 
(Ferrell, 2015). 
Conclusion: There was not enough reliable or complete information to determine 
whether a PCS policy change to extend TOS requirements would have positive or 
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negative effects. First, the cost data was neither consistent nor complete and should not 
be used by decisions makers. Second, DOD PCS programs are not only void of 
continuous process analysis and improvement, but they also could not identify and 
evaluate changes that may be driving PCS costs. Third, DOD could not provide complete 
and consistent data on waivers and exceptions. Last, although DOD planned to evaluate 
the potential benefits of extending the TOS requirement, without complete and consistent 
data, it was unable to evaluate whether implementing planned actions was effective 
(Farrell, 2015). 
Relevance: This report highlights the importance of evaluating PCS program and 
TOS requirements toward reducing costs. This study uses metrics that our research 
leverages in evaluating its data. For example, in determining the per-move cost, GAO 
divides total PCS cost of each PCS type by the number of service members moved. This 
method proved reliable in evaluating the cost per move and is reliable in our study. 
(Farrell, 2015). 
B. RAND CORPORATION: TOUR LENGTHS, PCS, AND SAVINGS AND 
IMPROVED STABILITY (RR-1034) 
Purpose: Bond, Guo, Lewis, Leonard and Roster (2016) conducted this study to 
support OSD’s requirement to report to Congress on the potential impacts and savings of 
extending TOS requirements. OSD’s report to Congress includes 1) cost savings 
associated with increased tour lengths, 2) impacts increased TOS would have on families, 
quality of life, and job performance 3) the impacts to professional development and 
promotional opportunities, and 4) the impacts on service members and their families 
serving in hardship locations (Bond et al., 2016).  
Scope and Methodology: The scope of this study by Bond et al. (2016) is DOD-
wide. Its primary focus is on Operational and Rotational PCS types because these types 
were considered more susceptible to policy changes. Although the study evaluates 
impacts and savings, it primarily concentrates on options for encouraging tour extensions. 
The study identifies four possible courses of action (COA) that could reduce the number 
of moves in the two aforementioned PCS types: 1) establish longer tour lengths, 2) 
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restrict circumstances for curtailments (i.e., exceptions and waivers to TOS), 3) simply 
encourage service members to extend, and 4) encourage service members to accept 
consecutive tours in the same location. A survey was developed to gauge a service 
member’s willingness to extend and what factors influenced their decision (though 
greater emphasis was given to those serving in overseas tours).  
A multivariate statistical model was then used to determine the number of service 
members that would be willing to extend for a financial incentive. The model uses a 
percentage of their base pay as the financial incentive. The study also reviews existing 
programs used to increase TOS (i.e. Assignment Incentive Pay [AIP] that is governed for 
all services by DOD Financial Management Regulation Volume 7A). This study also 
explores alternative incentive programs like an auction (Bond et al., 2016). 
Conclusion: Bond et al. (2016) concluded longer tours would ultimately reduce 
the number of personnel moving each year and thus result in cost reduction. However, the 
effect of a mandatory extension policy is unclear. On one hand, longer tours could result 
in unit and family stability as well as allow the service member to better develop as a 
subject matter expert (SME). On the other hand, longer assignments could reduce morale 
if stationed at an undesirable location or hinder career development if training 
opportunities were limited due to the nature of that assignment. Nonetheless, the study 
found 60% of members serving overseas were not willing to extend. Also, although the 
study’s statistical models indicate there was negative perception to increasing TOS 
(particularly in overseas tours) there was a substantial number of personnel that would be 
willing to extend if an attractive incentive package was offered.  
Further, the study concludes that programs, like AIPs, have several problems. 
First, they are structured as a “take-it-or-leave-it” programs and do not properly 
incentivize members because they do not account for individual preferences. 
Consequently, this can result in overpayments since it does not account for those that 
would have been willing to extend for less. Conversely, an auction enables service 
members to determine what they believe is the correct dollar incentive to commit to an 
extension. Auction-based programs may also mitigate overpayments to service members 
because only the lowest bids are considered and accepted (Bond et al., 2016). 
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Relevance: This RAND study provides a benchmark to use when evaluating the 
perceptions obtained from our Marine Corps sample population (a complete description of 
our sample population is found in Chapter III). For example, this survey concludes that a 
policy change that increases TOS could have negative impacts to morale and job 
performance. The survey also concludes that personal and family relationships have 
perceived negative impacts. Lastly, the study shows service members could be more 
willing to extend, even at an undesirable location, if given a financial incentive. We plan to 
design and conduct a similar survey to evaluate perceptions Marines have on the current 
TOS policy (Bond et al., 2016). 
C. RAND CORPORATION: ADVANCING MILITARY SPOUSE CAREERS 
(RR-784) 
Purpose: The primary goal of Friedman, Miller and Evans (2015) study was to 
evaluate the revised My Career Advancement Account (MyCAA) scholarship program, 
which was instituted in 2010. MyCAA assists eligible spouses in pursuing degrees, 
certificates, or licenses. The study specifically sought to understand educational and 
employment preferences of military spouses, as well as identify barriers that prevented 
spouses from using MyCAA and reaching their educational or employment goals 
(Friedman et al., 2015).  
Scope and Methodology: Friedman et al. (2015) focuses on the revised population 
of eligible spouses, which include the junior career ranks (i.e., E-1 to E-5, W-1 to W-2, 
and O-1 to O-2). An additional restriction to eligibility is that spouses could not be 
serving in the military. Data to analyze preference was gathered using a survey developed 
by Defense Manpower Data Center and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Military Communities and Family Policy. The survey is titled “DOD’s 2012 
Active Duty Spouses Survey” and was sent via email and direct mail to more than 
700,000 active-duty spouses in 2012; however, only 4,454 responses were analyzed using 
key demographic data found in personnel records (Friedman et al., 2015). 
Conclusion: Friedman et al. (2015) conclude MyCAA provides tuition of up to 
$4,000 ($2,000 limit per fiscal year). The study reveals that 82% of eligible spouses listed 
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“cost” as the key factor that prevented them from pursing higher education, while only 
25% cited frequent moves as a reason for not seeking educational opportunities. In the 
area of employment, child care was the primary reason for not seeking employment for 
those who wanted to work. Another 62% cited they wanted to “stay home to care for 
children” or said that “child care was too costly,” while only 23% of those wanting to 
work cited PCS as the reason for not working (Friedman et al., 2015).  
The study also showed that PCS greatly disrupts the ability to find employment 
after a move primarily because there were few opportunities available for their area of 
work or it took considerable time to acquire a new credentials after a military move. 
Table 3 shows nearly 60% of spouses experiencing a PCS move took longer than 4 
months to find employment. Table 4 shows 72% required new credentials to be 
employment eligible in their field. Moreover, it took nearly half of those spouses longer 
than 4 months to acquire the credential (Friedman et al., 2015). 
Table 3.   Time it took spouses to find employment after last PCS move. 
Adapted from Friedman, Miller, and Evans (2015). 
 Duration All Rank-Eligible Spouses (%) 
< 1 month 13 
1 Month to < 4 months 28 
4 months < 7 months 22 
7 months < 10 months 9 









Table 4.   Percentage requiring new certification and time it took to obtain. 
Adapted from Friedman, Miller, and Evans (2015).  
Required All Rank-Eligible Spouses (%) 
YES 72 
NO 28 
Duration All Rank-Eligible Spouses (%) 
< 1 month 14 
1 month to < 4 Months 37 
4 months to < 7 months 21 
7 months < 10 months 7 
> 10 months 20 
 
Relevance: This study helps understand how PCS creates a barrier to education 
and employment opportunities for military spouses. A PCS move is one of the top 
reasons for not seeking higher education and employment opportunities. Although PCS 
was ranked only 8 out of the top 16 reasons cited for not working, frequent moves are not 
irrelevant. As Tables 3 and 4 indicate, a PCS move can cause disruption in employment/
career continuity as well as employment certifications. While our research does not 
directly seek responses from military spouses, we are concerned with the perception that 
service members have regarding their spouse’s ability to seek higher education and 
maintain gainful employment. We are also concerned with how PCS frequency impacts 
the decision to make the Marine Corps a career (Friedman et al., 2015). 
D. RAND CORPORATION: CHALLENGES TO MILITARY SPOUSE 
EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION (RR-MG-196) 
Purpose: Like the previous research, Harrell, Lim, Castaneda and Golinelli (2004) 
evaluate the employment and educational opportunities of military spouses. This study 
seeks to answer whether employment issues were a function of demographics or other 
factors, such as frequent moves. Specifically, the study 1) provides a better illustration of 
military spouse employment; 2) explores employment issues for military spouses; and 3) 
identifies policies that could mitigate these issues and retain qualified personnel (Harrell 
et al., 2004).  
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Scope and Methodology: Harrell et al.’s (2004) report is a DOD-wide study that 
was based on quantitative and qualitative data obtained by interviewing more than 1,100 
military spouses. This info was used to gain an understanding of the personal perceptions 
and experiences of military spouses. The data used to identify demographic information 
(e.g., age, ethnicity, education) was obtained using the 1990 U.S. Census. This data was 
then compared with the 1999 Military Spouses Survey and the 1999 Current Population 
Survey to understand variations over time. The interviews were conducted either in-
person or over the phone. The interview used both closed and open-ended questions to 
gain a greater understanding of the perceptions of military spouses. Service member 
ranks ranged from E-1 to E-9 and O-1 to O-6. Also, the study focused primarily on 
wives’ responses since the number of male spouses were so few. Finally, the study 
provides a comparative analysis between military spouses and employment information 
of civilian spouses of the same demographic (Harrell et al., 2004). 
Conclusion: Harrell et al. (2004) concluded the majority (67%) of military 
spouses believe military lifestyle negatively affects their employment opportunities, with 
33% citing frequent moves as the primary cause. While this is in contrast to the MyCAA 
study, it is important to highlight that the MyCAA study focuses on junior Marine 
spouses. (Harrell et al., 2004). Additionally, this study concluded frequent moves also 
impact educational opportunities. Military moves resulted in difficulties transferring 
credit from one institution to the next. More importantly, spouses delayed further 
education due to expensive out-of-state tuition rates. The result was to either seek 
residency, which caused more delay, or simply wait until the service member separated 
from the military. Although PCS negatively impacted employment, the study indicates 
there are other reasons for not being employed. For instance, labor markets in some 
locations were not favorable for certain educations or qualifications and/or did not 
provide jobs with high paying opportunities. In these and other locations, low paying jobs 
did not overcome the high cost of child care; thus, the opportunity cost of working did 
not overcome the decision to stay home (Harrell et al., 2004). 
Relevance: Since our research seeks to understand the effects and perceptions to a 
policy change, this literature provides important backdrop to examine our survey data. 
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Although this study is more than a decade removed, it allows us to compare the 
perceptions of military spouses and juxtapose them with today’s service member’s 
opinion about how PCS moves impact their spouse’s educational and employment 
opportunities. Also, this literature provides other areas of consideration. For instance, 
although longer TOS requirements could save money, it could prove to have negative 
effects on the military service member’s decision to remain on active duty if the duty 
station is located in an area with poor education or employment opportunities (Harrell et 
al., 2004). 
E. NPS THESIS: ANALYZING BENEFITS OF EXTENDING MARINE CORPS 
PCS TEMPO  
Purpose: In his 2011 study, Morales evaluates the effects of increasing TOS 
requirements from 36 to 48 months. The effects can be characterized as costs, unit 
efficiency, individual promotions, and family stress.  
Scope and Methodology: The fiscal aspect of Morales’ study (2011) is Marine 
Corp-wide. The study summarizes the dollars spent to execute PCS orders and the total 
number of Marines who PCS’d during that same year. The data used was obtained from 
Manpower Management Office at Headquarters Marine Corps, Manpower and Reserve 
Affairs (M&RA). The data was collected for a 10-year period from 2001 to 2010. It is 
important to note that the aggregate quantities include all PCS types listed in Chapter I. 
The average savings was determined 1) normalizing the data for inflation; 2) calculating 
the average cost per move; 3) calculating the total savings per Marine in a 20 year period; 
and 4) calculating the average annual savings. Table 5 shows the result of these 





Table 5.   Potential savings. Adapted from Morales (2011). 
Average Cost-Per-Move $4,076 
Total Savings from 36 months to 48 months over a 20 year 
career $6,930 
Annual Saving per Marine $346 
 
To evaluate unit efficiency, inspection results were obtained from Field Supply 
Maintenance Analysis Office, and manning levels were obtained from Manpower 
Management Enlisted Affairs and M&RA, Headquarters Marine Corps. Analysis was 
then performed by comparing the inspection scores with the unit’s personnel strength 
(Morales, 2011).  
To evaluate the PCS program, effected areas like promotion, unit cohesion, unit 
effectiveness, and family stress, a survey was sent to active duty Marines from an 
infantry battalion, a communications battalion, a recruiting command, and academic 
detachments. The total number of respondents was 105, from ranks ranging from E-5 
through O-5, or Sergeant through Lieutenant Colonel (Morales, 2011).  
Conclusion: Morales concluded there are positive and negative effects to 
extending TOS (2011). Examples include substantial annual savings ($14.6 million 
according to this study) to decreased spousal employment and education opportunities 
(Morales, 2011).  
Relevance: This study analyzes much of the area we hope to evaluate. However, 
this study evaluates the potential cost savings using the aggregate amounts across all PCS 
types. In our evaluation, we remove the PCS types that arguably would not be susceptible 
to changes in TOS (e.g., Accessions). By removing Accession and Training PCS types, 
which frequently occur prior to 36 months, we seek to gain a more relevant and accurate 
savings prediction (Morales, 2011).  
F. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 
Overview: Boardman’s work is a comprehensive resource tool on Cost Benefit 
Analysis (CBA). CBA was originally used in the U.S. in the 1930s. The Flood Control 
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Act of 1936 required the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to conduct CBAs for flood 
control and harbor deepening projects. CBA gained global recognition in the 1960s when 
it was promoted by the UK’s Minister of Transportation. Today, CBA is used worldwide 
to support everything from infrastructure in developing countries to court system 
procedures. A CBA tries to consider all of the costs and benefits to a society as a whole. 
CBA can be a useful public sector decision- making tool toward maximizing limited 
resources. As such, many government agencies require CBA during regulatory change 
(Boardman, 2011).  
Boardman achieves his goal of producing a reference that is conceptually sound, 
practically oriented, and easily accessible to both students and practitioners. The author 
spends a great deal of time explaining the fundamental concepts of CBA. The author also 
effectively integrates relevant examples and illustrations to simplify and bring additional 
context. The 300 page, 20-chapter text begins with an overview of each step of the CBA 
process before dedicating entire sections to developing each step. The work provides 
helpful valuation tools and techniques and concludes by analyzing the strengths and 
limitations of CBA (Boardman, 2011).  
Relevance: This reference serves as an academic reference in the conduct of our 
research. While we are not completing a full CBA, our research methodology pivots off 
the concepts presented in Boardman’s work. 
G. MASTERING METRICS: THE PATH FROM CAUSE TO EFFECT 
Overview: According to Angrist and Pischke, econometrics is the use of data to 
answer cause-and-effect relationships. Econometrics is the combination of data, analysis, 
and judgement paired with statistical inference (2015). This work presents the essential 
tools of econometric research and explains why econometrics is useful. The authors 
explain five of the most valuable econometric methods by using real world examples and 
important issues on the political agenda. The work specifically focuses on extending 
simple correlation to identifying causation. For example, does having health insurance 
really make one healthy? In other words, Mastering Metrics uses data and statistics to 
show the path from cause to effect (Angrist and Pischke, 2015). 
 19
Relevance: We use regression to explain our survey results of the intangible 
impacts to a TOS policy change.  
H. COST ESTIMATION: METHODS AND TOOLS 
Overview: This is a comprehensive reference on cost estimation written by two 
accomplished NPS professors, Gregory Mislick and Daniel Nussbaum. The topics 
covered include: statistical and non-statistical cost estimating relationships; inflation 
indices; cost improvement (learning) curves; time phasing; uncertainty and economic 
analysis. Regression analysis, however, is the most integral part of the course, and is 
applied extensively to assess relationships between dependent and independent variables. 
(Mislick and Nussbaum, 2015). 
Relevance: Regression is a relevant tool in our analysis, too. We use regression to 
explain our survey results of the intangible impacts to a TOS policy change.  
I. SUMMARY 
This literature review provides the basis for our research. The GAO reports and 
RAND studies provide essential backdrop for analyzing PCS policy changes and 
potential benefits, while the thesis and academic resources provide the academic models 
as a foundation for analyzing preexisting cost data and perceptions data obtained through 
our survey.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
The following is an overview of our methodology:  
 Collect PCS expense data for previous 5 FYs from PCS program 
lead at Headquarters Marine Corps.  
 Perform cost analysis on PCS costs using an increase TOS 
requirement from 3 to 5 years; focus on core PSC types (e.g. 
Operational and Rotational) and compare to and improve upon 
findings in literature review.  
 Identify relevant quality of life impact categories and develop 
survey accordingly. 
 Distribute survey to Marine units that have sufficient sample size 
and are representative of USMC (i.e., genders, ranks, MOSs). 
 Analyze survey results and compare to findings in literature 
review. 
 Capture the “voice” of Marine families and tell their story using 
the fundamentals and academic models (e.g. Regression) learned in 
the NPS MBA curriculum. 
Our original intent was to conduct a CBA on alternatives to the TOS status quo; 
however, researching the implicit costs and intangibles is the area we felt we could make 
the greatest contribution toward improving a Marine’s quality of life. Explicit PCS costs 
are important (and are addressed in this report), but also analyzing attitudes provides 
leadership with more comprehensive information with which to make decisions. 
Accordingly, we dedicate our efforts to capturing how Marines feel about the current 
TOS policy. Instead of developing TOS policy alternatives, we focus on a defined policy 
change. Our research assesses the current TOS policy and captures the attitudes and 
perceptions of Marines if the Marine Corps were to change TOS requirements from three 
to five years. We use a survey as our primary means to capture attitudes about TOS 
requirements. We then apply econometric and cost estimation tools to analyze the data 
captured in the survey. In short, our methodology captures the “voice” of Marine families 
and tells their story.  
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Our more narrow approach is not to say a CBA is not worthwhile; in fact, it is our 
desire that our focused research be used to support a TOS CBA. Therefore, we feel it is 
important for the reader to understand how our analysis relates to a CBA. 
A CBA systematically catalogues impacts as benefits (pros) and costs (cons), 
values them in dollars, and then determines the net benefit of the proposal relative to the 
status quo. A CBA considers all costs and benefits to a society, including economic, 
accounting, and opportunity costs (Boardman, 2011). According to Boardman (2011), a 
CBA is “a policy assessment method that quantifies in monetary terms the value of all 
consequences of a policy to members of society who have standing” where “the 
aggregate value of a policy is measured by its net social benefits (NSB)” (p. 2). In 
mathematical terms, NSB equals social benefits minus social costs. The purpose of CBA 
is to make social decision-making more rationale. Analyst use CBA to demonstrate 
whether an intervention to current policy is a more efficient use of society’s limited 
resources. Boardman (2011) breaks the CBA process into nine basic steps: 
1. Specify the set of alternative projects. 
2. Identify stakeholders and decide whose benefits and costs count (who has 
“standing”) 
3. Identify the impact categories, catalogue them, and select measurement 
indicators. 
4. Predict the impacts quantitative over the life of the project. 
5. Monetize (attach dollar values to) all impacts. 
6. Discount benefits and costs to obtain present values 
7. Compute the net present value of each alternative. 
8. Perform sensitivity analysis. 
9. Make a recommendation. (p. 6) 
Our methodology focuses exclusively on the third step. Step 3 requires analysts to 
identify the impact categories of the proposed alternatives, record them as benefits or 
costs, and specify the measurement for each. From a CBA perspective, analysts are 
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interested only in impacts that affect the utility of those who have standing (Boardman, 
2011). The following impact categories were explored in our TOS research:  
 PCS Expense Incurred 
 Dependent Children Social Development  
 Spouse’s Career 
 Productivity and Proficiency  
 Professional Relationships and Unit Cohesion 
 Military Life / Family Morale  
 Attrition, Turnover, Recruiting and Training  
 Institutional Perceptions  
PSC expenses are significant. The Marine Corps has approximately 183K active 
duty service members, with one-third moving each year to align with the current three 
year PCS rotation schedule. Furthermore, the Marine Corps requires its personnel to 
move more often than the other services (Stewart, 2001). Our research evaluates 
aggregate PCS expenses at the institutional level. We collected PCS expense data for 
FY2001 to FY2010 using the Department of the Navy’s (DON) Justification of Budget 
Estimate books. This source shows the number of Marines who executed PCS orders per 
FY, broken out by the PCS types described in Table 1, Chapter I.  
We perform cost analysis simulating an increase TOS requirement. However, 
unlike the research conducted by Morales discussed in Literature Review, we focus 
exclusively on Operational and Rotational PSC types. We believe Morales was thorough, 
but erroneously included all PCS types and overestimated the number of movers and 
underestimated savings as a result. As discussed in Chapter I, we omit the PCS categories 
that only impact total force structure and are not relevant to a TOS policy change. We 
hope to improve upon his findings and present a more accurate picture of how a TOS 
policy change affects PCS expenses.  
For consistency, we use the same mathematical formulas, data source, and 
inflation index that Morales used in his study. For example, the raw expenses in Table 6 
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will be normalized by dividing by the FY2010 Military Personnel, Marine Corps 
Appropriation Raw Index as the base year. This study even uses Morales’ 4 year rotation 
proposal to ensure a truly apples-to-apples comparison.  
Table 6.   Raw operational (O) and rotational (R) PCS expense and frequency. 
Adapted from DON (2016).  
Fiscal 
Year 
O + R $ # O + R 
Moves 
FY2001 $169,713,000 27,420 
FY2002 $164,829,000 26,792 
FY2003 $200,462,000 27,251 
FY2004 $206,240,000 26,704 
FY2005 $213,552,000 27,866 
FY2006 $246,724,000 32,459 
FY2007 $258,267,000 37,324 
FY2008 $307,267,000 25,677 
FY2009 $369,417,000 33,076 
FY2010 $344,410,000 31,824 
Total $2,480,881,000 296,393 
 
First, X bar, which is the average cost per PCS from FY2001 to FY2010, will be 
calculated using the raw data in Table 6.  
X bar = (SUM annual PCS $) / (SUM PCS orders executed) 
Second, the number of times a Marine moves in a career is calculated. Under the current 
policy, a Marine executes 6.7 PCS moves during a 20 year career. This value was found 
by dividing a 20 year career by the current three year rotation cycle. For simplicity, 
Morales did not consider accession, training, or separations PCS types that involve much 
shorter TOS requirements. Therefore, the average cost to PCS a Marine every three years 
during a 20 year career is found by multiplying X bar by 6.7. Likewise, since a Marine 
will PCS four times under the new policy, one can estimate the average cost during the 
same 20 year career by multiplying X bar by four. Y bar is the career savings per Marine 
that would occur by changing the PCS rotation cycle from three to n years.  
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Therefore, Y bar = (average cost to PCS a Marine every 3 years during a 20 year 
career) - (average cost to PCS a Marine every # years during a 20 year career): 
 
Y bar = (20/3)(X bar) – (20/n)(X bar) 
 
Finally, Y bar can be expressed in annual terms (Z bar) by dividing by the 20 year career 
timespan, or: 
Z bar = Y bar / 20 
 
The remaining seven impact categories are important intangibles. In fact, these 
qualitative impact categories serve as the core to our research. We developed an 
anonymous and voluntary survey around those categories to elicit feedback. The NPS’s 
Institutional Review Board approved our survey instrument and research design. The 
survey was conducted on-line through LimeSurvey. To solicit responses, an email with a 
link to the survey was sent to approximately 1,000 Marines between October and 
November 2016. Since the quality of research is a function of the number of responses, it 
was important to obtain as large a response rate as possible. The survey was designed to 
take approximately 10 minutes and at the convenience of the subject.  
Targeting the correct audience was also an important consideration. Because 
every Marine would be impacted by a TOS policy change, we thought it essential to 
survey diverse units. Accordingly, the survey was distributed to Marines attending NPS 
and Marines assigned to 12th Marine Corps Recruiting District. These units were 
deliberately chosen because they likely represent the Marine Corps. For example, every 
rank, both genders, and nearly all MOS are represented at the recruiting district. 
Additionally, while NPS primarily has Captains and Majors, nearly every MOS is 
represented in this group as well.  
Respondents were first asked for basic demographic information, rank, marital 
status, number of dependents, and years of service in the Marine Corps. The survey then 
proceeded in two areas 1) TOS Impact to Career and 2) TOS Impact to Quality of Life. 
TOS Impact to Career are qualitative questions designed to examine an active duty 
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Marine’s perception about how the current TOS policy impacts career progression. TOS 
Impact to Quality of Life are qualitative questions to examine perceptions on how the 
current TOS policy impacts quality of life. We felt asking deliberate questions in each of 
these categories would produce the most comprehensive results from the group who has 
the most standing in a TOS policy change - Marines. See the Appendix for complete 
survey. Last, we use descriptive statistics and regression to analyze the data captured in 
the survey.  
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. PCS EXPENSES 
As discussed in Chapter III, the average cost per PCS is represented by X bar. The 
raw expenses in Table 6 has been normalized and is represented in Table 7.  
Table 7.   Normalized operational (O) and rotational (R) PCS expense. 
Adapted from Morales (2011) and DON (2016). 
Fiscal Year O+R $ FY2010 1105 
Raw Index 
Normalized O + R 
($FY10) 
FY2001 $169,713,000 0.7128 $238,093,434 
FY2002 $164,829,000 0.7548 $218,374,404 
FY2003 $200,462,000 0.7931 $252,757,534 
FY2004 $206,240,000 0.8263 $249,594,578 
FY2005 $213,552,000 0.8554 $249,651,625 
FY2006 $246,724,000 0.8827 $279,510,593 
FY2007 $258,267,000 0.9042 $285,630,392 
FY2008 $307,267,000 0.9326 $329,473,515 
FY2009 $369,417,000 0.9671 $381,984,283 
FY2010 $344,410,000 1 $344,410,000 
 Total $2,480,881,000  $2,829,480,357 
 
X bar is then calculated by dividing the total normalized amount in Table 7 by the 
total number of PCS moves identified in Table 6.  
X bar = (SUM Normalized PCS $) / (SUM PCS orders executed) 
X bar = $2,829,480,357 / 296,393 = $9,546.38 
Recall from Chapter III that a Marine PCSs 6.7 times during a 20 year career 
under the current three year PCS rotation cycle; therefore, the average cost to PCS a 
Marine every three years during a 20 year career is $63,958, while the average cost 
during the same 20 year career is reduced to $47,730 using Morales four year rotation 
proposal. In other words, the Marine Corps saves $16,229 in career PCS costs per Marine 
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if it were to relax the PCS rotation cycle from three to four years using only Operational 
and Rotational PCS types. The following equation shows this calculation:  
Y bar = (6.7)($9,546) – (5)($9,546) = $16,229 
This amount is substantially more than the $4,076 figure Morales calculated using all 
PCS types. Now consider the impact when expressing Y bar in annual terms (Z bar).  
Z bar = y bar / 20 
Z bar = $16,229 / 20 = $811 
Again, this amount is 58% more than the $346 figure Morales calculated using all 
PCS types. While $346 and $811 may not seem significant in a multimillion-dollar 
budget, the financial impacts become so when multiplied by the average number of 
moves per year. For example, Morales found the average number of moves per year using 
all PCS types to be 106,712. When multiplied by $346, Morales determined the Marine 
Corps would save $37M in PCS expenses per year. Our study found the average number 
of moves per year using Operational and Rotational PCS types to only be 29,639 using 
the same raw data. Yet, when multiplied by $811, we estimate the Marine Corps still 
saves $24M in PCS expense per year. The following equations show these calculations. 
Total Annual Savings = (Z bar) * (average # moves during a 10 year period) 
($346)*(106,712) = $36,975,222 
($811)*(29,639) = $24,050,583 
Finally, a five year TOS policy would increase Z bar to $1,289 and save the Marine 
Corps $38M annual. This multistep calculation is displayed as follows: 
Y bar = (6.7)($9,546) – (4)($9,546) = $25,774 
Z bar = $25,774 / 20 = $1,289 
Total = $1,289 * 29,639 = $38,204,671 
While Morales’ analysis yields 35% more savings than our approach, he does so 
by considering 72% more PCS moves, of which 100% are fixed toward force shaping. 
Therefore, by focusing only on core PCS types and omitting PCS categories that are not 
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influenced by a TOS policy change, we believe we improved upon Morale’s findings and 
present a more relevant picture of how a TOS policy change impacts the PCS expenses.  
B. SURVEY RESULTS 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
This report documents Marines’ perceptions of TOS via a qualitative survey. 
Qualitative survey responses are an excellent way to access attitudes about policies such 
as TOS. A total of 262 Marines completed the survey, and Table 8 contains summary 
statistics of the respondents. Responses were mandatory for all questions; therefore, there 
is no incomplete data. We omitted responses from one E3 and one O6 because they were 
the only Marines who responded from their pay grade. Accordingly, all results are 
analyzed using 260 total responses.  
Table 8.   Sample population summary statistics.  
 MEAN 
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS 260 
E5 .09 
E6 – E9 .25 
O2 – O3 .39 
O4 – O5 .26 
TIME IN SERVICE 11.30 
PCS MOVES 4.5 
MALE .88 
MARRIED .78 
DEPENDENT CHILDREN 1.4 
SPOUSE EMPLOYED .37 
 
The majority of respondents were married (88%) and male (78%). On average, 
respondents had 11.3 years TIS, had moved 4.5 times, and had 1.4 dependent children. 
37% had employed spouses. Although the units we selected are diverse, the distribution 
of ranks who responded does not match the distribution of ranks in the Marine Corps 
population. For example, according the Marine Corps’ Total Force Data Warehouse 
database, 40% of the Marine Corps is E1-E3, but our sample does not capture responses 
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from these ranks. Therefore, we cannot be sure that our results are externally valid for the 
entire Marine Corps. However, 100% of our responses are from more senior pay grades 
who, through personal experience, can better attest to the enduring challenges and 
opportunities of military lifestyle than can junior enlisted ranks.  
2. Qualitative Questions 
We asked a set of questions to examine an active duty Marine’s perception about 
how the current TOS policy affects career. We asked Marines how satisfied they were 
with the current TOS policy. As shown in Figure 1, an overwhelming 80% reported being 
neutral to completely satisfied, while only 20% reported being unsatisfied.  
 
Figure 1.  Survey question: How satisfied are you with the Marine Corps’ 
current TOS policy to move Marines every three years?  
We then asked Marines the degree to which they agree or disagree with the 
statements “The current TOS policy adequately provides career development” and “The 
current TOS policy adequately provides MOS proficiency and productivity.” These 
results are summarized in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. Most Marines took a neutral or 
slightly favorable position to both statements. Only 14% disagree with the first statement, 
while only 21% of respondents disagree with the second statement. The results were 
similar when these two statements were rephrased as questions. The first question was 
“Do you think a longer TOS policy would improve career development?”; 38% answered 
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yes. The second question was “Do you think a longer TOS policy will improve individual 
productivity?”; 47% answered yes. 
 
Figure 2.   Survey statement: The current TOS policy adequately 
provides career development.  
 
Figure 3.  Survey statement: The current TOS policy adequately provides MOS 
proficiency and productivity. 
Regardless of rank, respondents believe that the current TOS policy adequately 
enables career progression. Overall, Marines feel the current policy neither really 
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enhances nor detracts productivity. Importantly, few respondents believe that the current 
TOS policy has negative career implications.  
We suspected that institutional perceptions influenced these results, however. 
Therefore, we asked Marines if they feel “homesteading” has a negative perception 
within the current Marine Corps’ culture. “Homesteading” is a term used for Marines that 
remain in a geographic area for multiple tours. 69% answered yes according to Table 9. 
Although the majority of Marines feel the current TOS adequately supports career 
development, we feel the survey results could have been a consequence to the current 
culture. The current culture is that if a Marine remains at a location for an extended 
period then the individual and institution suffer. Senior leadership believes 
“homesteading” stifles professional development, limits leadership opportunities, and 
demonstrates less dedication. Other arguments include Marines lose their expeditionary 
mindset or become complacent. Without this influence, we believe a larger percentage of 
Marines would have agreed more that longer TOS better enables their careers. 
We also asked a series of questions to elicit perceptions on how the current TOS 
policy impacts quality of life. We asked Marines “Do you think increasing TOS will 
improve quality-of-life?” As shown in Table 9, the majority (67%) believed quality of 
life would increase as TOS increases. There was only a slight difference between marital 
status. 70% of Married said yes, while 58% of single said yes.  
Table 9.   Survey questions about career and quality of life impacts. 
Impacts to Career Percentage stating “Yes” 
Do you think a longer TOS policy would improve career 
development? 38% 
Do you think increasing TOS will improve individual productivity? 47% 
Do you think increasing TOS will sacrifice unit readiness? 15% 
Do you think increasing TOS will improve quality-of-life? 67% 
If assigned to an undesired geographic location, will an increased 
TOS requirement negatively impact your retention? 78% 
Would you be willing to remain at an undesired location if you 
received additional leave per month? 26% 
Do you feel “homesteading” has a negative perception within the 
current Marine Corps’ culture? 69% 
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First, we asked Marines how the current policy impacts their spouse. On a scale of 
1 to 5 we asked Marines how strongly they agree or disagree with the following 
statement (1 being completely disagree and 5 being completely agree): “The current TOS 
is a factor in your spouse’s decision to work.” Figure 4 shows that 36% completely agree 
and 22% mostly agree, while 31% disagree. These results trended consistently across the 
ranks.  
 
Figure 4.   Survey statement: The current TOS is a factor in 
your spouse’s decision to work. 
Using the same graduated scale, we asked Marines how strongly they agree or 
disagree with the following statement: “After a PCS move, it is difficult for your spouse 
to find acceptable employment and maintain his/her career.” As shown in Figure 5, 62% 
agree (and 39% completely agree), while only 21% disagree. The same figure shows that 
that the results are skewed right and increase steadily across all ranks.  
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Figure 5.  Survey statement: After a PCS move, it is difficult for your spouse to 
find acceptable employment and maintain his/her career. 
Last, we asked “How does the current TOS policy affect your spouse’s ability to 
advance in his / her area of work?” All ranks trended equally toward adverse. Figure 6 
shows that 59% reported the current policy has adverse implications; 38% reported no 
impact, and only 3% reported the current policy positively impacts their spouse’s ability 
to advance his or her area of work. Although the spouse employment questions were 
asked differently, the results consistently supported that the current TOS policy creates 
challenges for military spouses who work or would like to work.  
 
Figure 6.  Survey question: How does the current TOS policy affect your 
spouse’s ability to advance in his / her area of work? 
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Similar results occurred when asked about how the current TOS policy impacts 
dependent children. Figure 7 shows 63% said the current policy adversely affects their 
child’s ability to obtain and sustain relationships. 30% reported no impact and only 7% 
reported a positive impact. All ranks trended similarly as well.  
 
Figure 7.  Survey question: How does the current TOS policy affect your child’s 
/ children’s ability to obtain and sustain relationships? 
Finally, we asked a series of questions to give us more information on how TOS 
impacts retention. We asked Marines “If you were stationed at an ideal location, would 
you prefer to never PCS, PCS every 3 years (current policy), or PCS every 5 years 
(proposed new policy)?” The results are displayed in Figure 8. All ranks preferred to PCS 
every five years. The majority (51%) prefer to PCS every five years; 25% prefer to never 
PCS, and 24% prefer to PCS every three years. It comes as no surprise that Marines 
would rather stay in an ideal location for an entire career than move every three years. 
What is interesting, however, is all ranks but E5 would rather move from an ideal 
location after five years than never move. This means that the Marines surveyed see the 




Figure 8.  Survey question: If you were stationed at an ideal location, would you 
prefer to never PCS, PCS every 3 years (current policy), or PCS every 
5 years (proposed new policy)? 
Next, we looked at attitude toward an undesirable location. We asked Marines “If 
you were stationed at an undesirable location, would you prefer to never PCS, PCS every 3 
years (current policy), or PCS every 5 years (proposed new policy)?” The results shown in 
Figure 9 are overwhelming. Under this scenario, 0% prefer to never PCS, 88% prefer to 
PCS every three years, and 12% prefer to PCS every five years. Further, when asked “If 
assigned to an undesired geographic location, will an increased TOS requirement 
negatively impact your retention?,” 78% answered yes. Therefore, we extended our 
research to find out how incentives, such as monetary compensation, changed responses 
and what amounts were most effective.  
 
Figure 9.  Survey question: If you were stationed at an undesirable location, would 
you prefer to never PCS, PCS every 3 years (current policy), or PCS 
every 5 years (proposed new policy)? 
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As summarized in Figure 10, all Marines were asked an initial baseline question 
“If you were at an undesirable location, would you accept a bonus of 15% of your base 
annual salary to stay in place for an additional year?”; 62% answered yes. Those who 
answered yes were then asked if they would accept a 10% bonus to stay in place for an 
additional year; 44% answered yes. Those who agreed to a 10% bonus were then asked if 
they would accept a 5% bonus; 35% answered yes.  
The 38% who answered no to the initial baseline question were then asked if they 
would accept a bonus of 20% to stay in place; 74% still said no. We continued only with 
the 74% who denied a 20% bonus and asked them if they would stay in place at an 
undesirable location for an additional year if offered a 25% bonus instead; 57% still said 
no. It is clear that geographic preference is significant for this sub group. The majority of 
those who initially said no continued to say no even though offered more money.  
 
Figure 10.  Minimum bonus to remain at an undesirable location 
for an additional year. 
Last, we accessed the same impact using a non-monetary incentive. We asked 
“Would you be willing to remain at an undesired location if you received additional leave 
per month.” As shown in in Table 9, 26% said yes meaning money is a much more 
attractive incentive tool when designing a retention plan around a TOS policy.  
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3. Regression 
Regression is used to understand and qualify the relationship between variables 
and to make predictions. It is important to note that understanding the relationship is not 
the same as identifying causation. In other words, regression does not show how a change 
in one variable causes a change in another.  
We ran a regression to help understand the relationship between the variables 
involved in whether or not a Marine believes increased TOS improves quality of life. The 
results are shown in Table 10. We regressed quality of life against the set of independent 
variables we felt to be most relevant.  














Child (age 0–5) 0.009 
(0.039) 
Child (age 6–11) 0.023 
(0.038) 
Child (age 12–14) -0.073 
(0.100) 
Child (age 15–18) 0.012 
(0.093) 
Child (age 19<) 0.016 
(0.087) 





Mean of dep variable 0.673 
Notes: ***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<.1 Omitted variables rank of E5, Time of Station in Years, 
Single, and Female. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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The outcome, or dependent variable, of the regression model is a binary variable for 
whether a respondent believes increasing TOS will improve quality of life. The vertical 
column contains regression coefficients, or independent variables, for the model. Each 
regression coefficient reflects the statistical relationship (correlation, not causation) 
between independent variables and the outcome, holding all other variables constant. In this 
regression, the Coefficient of Determination, or R-squared, is moderate, which indicates 
that the observable demographic variables explain the majority of the variation in beliefs. 
In other words, the regressions’ set of independent variables explain 67% of the outcome’s 
variation.  
There are additional variables that are worth noting. For example, holding all 
other independent variables constant, married Marines are 17% more likely than single 
Marines to believe that increased TOS positively impacts quality of life. Additionally, 
those with middle school aged children are 7% less likely to believe that increased TOS 
positively impacts quality of life. All other age categories have a positive coefficient, 
indicating Marines with children not in middle school are more likely to believe that 
increased TOS enhances quality of life.  
Using the same set of independent variables, we ran a second regression to help 
understand the relationship to with whether or not a Marine would remain at an undesirable 
location in exchange for monetary compensation. Specifically, the outcome is a percentage 
indicating the average minimum bonus a Marine surveyed would accept to remain in place 





















Child (age 0–5) 0.123 
(0.666) 
Child (age 6–11) 0.010 
(0.614) 
Child (age 12–14) 1.796 
(1.644) 
Child (age 15–18) -1.271 
(1.603) 
Child (age 19<) -2.751* 
(1.466) 





Mean of dep variable 14.312 
Notes: ***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<.1 Omitted variables rank of E5, Time of 
Station in Years, Single, and Female. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
There were 218 observations in this regression. Recall that of the 260 surveyed, 
38% said no to the initial 15% bonus question. 74% then said no to a 20% bonus and 
54% still declined when offered a 25% bonus, thus leaving 42 Marines who said no to all 
amounts offered in the survey. We did not a build greater bonus into the survey because 
the amount becomes unaffordable and unrealistic for the institution; however, it is likely 
these 42 Marines would have agreed to an amount greater than 25%.  
Several results are of note. First, the mean was 14.3%, which is the minimum 
bonus to remain in place at an undesirable location. For a Marine E6 with 10 years’ time 
in service, this would equate to $5,850 ($3,409 monthly base pay x 12 months x 14.3%), 
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or about the difference in annual pay to the next higher pay grade. In terms of overall 
PCS savings, the bonus offsets a typical PCS travel claim that would have otherwise been 
paid to the member. However, the bonus is favorable to the government since it not only 
retains a Marine, but also avoids incurring the additional HHG portion of a PCS move 
(again, this would be an area to explore further in a CBA). Second, the R-squared is 78%, 
which indicates the regressions’ set of independent variables explain most of the variation 
in the outcome.  
Finally, it is interesting to note that, holding all other variables constant, the E6-
E9 and O2-O5 observations required an average of 7% more bonus than did an E5s. 
Married Marines required 1.44% more bonus than single Marines, and Marines with 
older children did not require as large a bonus as did Marines with younger children. 
Finally, as shown in Figure 10, the majority of Marines surveyed (73%) said the 
minimum bonus they would be willing to accept to remain at an undesirable location for 
an additional year is 15% or less. This finding is consistent across all ranks surveyed.  
Since these regression associations are not causal, we caution their use for policy-
making purposes. Nonetheless, if Marine leadership is interested in how a specific 
demographic feels about the relationship between increased TOS and quality of life or 
retention incentives, then these regression results serve a credible point of departure to 
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V. CONCLUSION  
This report documents the findings of a comprehensive survey from Marines 
about their beliefs about TOS requirements. The purpose of the survey was to gather 
information from Marines about how they feel about the current TOS policy as well as 
how they would feel if the requirements increased from three to five years. The survey 
collected information from 260 Marines from two diverse commands. Our findings 
demonstrate opportunity to save money and potential to increase quality of life without 
adversely affecting readiness. For example, the Marine Corps stands to save $38M 
annually by increasing its rotation cycle from three to five years. There were several 
interesting qualitative points derived from survey responses.  
First, while 80% reported that the current TOS policy adequately supports career 
development, 69% feel homesteading has a negative perception with the current culture. 
Consequently, we feel the response rate would not have been as favorable if the current 
culture was supportive of longer TOS. Alternatively, 67% think longer TOS will improve 
quality of life. Specifically, 62% of Marines surveyed said the current TOS policy makes 
it difficult for their spouse to find acceptable employment and 63% said the current TOS 
policy adversely affects their child’s ability to sustain relationships. Next, we found that 
if stationed at an ideal location then 51% prefer to PCS every five years if given the 
option to PCS every five years, every three years, or never PCS.  
What is interesting is Marines surveyed would rather move from an ideal location 
after five years than never move. This means they see the value in moving, so long as it is 
less frequent than every three years. If stationed at an undesirable location, however, we 
found that 0% prefer tor to never PCS if stationed at an undesirable location and 88% 
prefer to PCS every three years. Furthermore, 78% said being assigned to an undesirable 
location would negatively influence their consideration to reenlist.  
Finally, 62% said they would accept a 15% bonus to remain in place at an 
undesirable location, and of the 38% who declined the 15% bonus, 74% also declined a 
20% bonus. The majority of those who initially said no continued to say no even when 
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offered more money. Non-monetary incentives were also explored, but they did not prove 
effective. For example, 74% said they would not remain at an undesirable location for 
additional leave. Therefore, money is a much more attractive incentive tool when 
designing a retention plan around a TOS policy change.  
We take these results as evidence that Marines support longer TOS and a change 
in policy might be beneficial to the institution. Although we cannot formally state 
whether a policy change passes a CBA, the intangible benefits appear to be highly valued 
by the Marines surveyed. Moreover, there appears to be an opportunity for substantial 
savings. Our findings suggest the institution can save money and increase quality of life 
for its families without degrading individual or unit readiness. Marine leadership should 
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